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An Intermediate Standard for Equal Protection
Review of Municipal Residence Requirements
I. INTRODUCTION
Employees of many American cities' must reside within municipal
borders or lose their jobs.2 Such municipal requirements are a continuing
source of litigation and political controversy.4 Public reaction to these re-
1. This Comment does not attempt a survey of current municipal residence requirements. Because the
requirements may be imposed in a particular jurisdiction by state statute, municipal ordinance, civil service
regulation, department rule, or local custom and are, therefore, subject to easy amendment, a list of current
requirements would be of fleeting value. For a 1974 survey of requirements in the fifty largest American cities,
see Note, Municipal Employee Residency Requirements and Equal Protection, 84 YALE L.J. 1684, 1686-89
(1975).
2. E.g., YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO, CIVIL SERV. COMM'N art. IV, § 9(F) (1972) provides: "Any officer or
employee not residing within the city limits of Youngstown ... is subject to dismissal from the service of the
city." In Fraternal Order of Police, Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Hunter, 49 Ohio App. 2d 185, 360 N.E.2d 708
(1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976), the Youngstown rule was held valid only as it applied prospectively to
police and firemen. See text accompanying notes 82-87 infra. A Newark, N.J., residence requirement has
spawned four cases dealing with the validity of the requirements and various waiver issues. The ordinance
provides:
All officers and employees of the city now in the employ of or hereafter to be employed by the city are
hereby required as a condition of their continued employment to have their place of abode in the city
and to be bona fide residents therein except as otherwise provided by the charter. A bona fide resident,
for the purpose of this section, is a person having a permanent domicile within the city and one which
has not been adopted with the intention of again taking up or claiming a previous residence acquired
outside of the city limits. The director of any department or the mayor or city clerk is hereby author-
ized in his discretion, for good cause shown, to permit any officer or employee of the city in his
respective department or office to remain in the employ of the city without complying with the
provisions hereof, where:
(a) The health of any officer or employee necessitated residence outside of the city limits;
(b) The nature of the employment is such as to require residence outside of the city limits;
(c) Special circumstances exist justifying residence outside of the city limits.
Failure of any officer or employee to comply with this section shall be cause for his removal or
discharge from the city service.
NEWARK, N.J., REV. ORDINANCE 2:14-1 (1951). See Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61,319 A.2d
483 (1974); Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959); Trainor v. City of Newark, 145 N.J.
Super. 466, 368 A.2d 381 (App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 74 N.J. 255, 377 A.2d 661 (1977); Smith v. City of
Newark, 136 N.J. Super. 107, 344 A.2d 782 (App. Div. 1975).
3. This Comment uses the term municipal residence requirements; the requirements are often referred to
as municipal residency requirements, bona fide continuing residence requirements, or post-employment resi-
dence requirements. A distinction is made between a municipal residence requirement and a durational require-
ment, which imposes a requirement of residence for a specified number of years before appointment to a job,
receipt of a governmental benefit, or exercise of the right to vote. Many durational requirements have been held
unconstitutional when a fundamental right was impaired or a benefit withheld and the length of residence
required was longer than is necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Memorial Hospital
v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969).
4. Municipal residence requirements are not new. Some of the earliest-reported cases dealing with the
application of the requirements are Fox v. McDonald, 101 Ala. 51, 13 So. 416 (1893), Johnson v. State ex rel.
Davis, 132 Ala. 43, 31 So. 493 (1901), Hellyer v. Prendergast, 176 A.D. 383, 162 N.Y.S. 788 (1917). Said one
commentator in 1914, after first decrying durational residence requirements, "Where ... a non-resident has
been selected for a more or less permanent office it seems reasonable ... that he should become identified with
the affairs of the city to the extent of taking up his residence there." N. MATTHEWS, MUNICIPAL CHARTERS
57 (1914; McGrath reprint 1969).
Trainor v. City of Newark, 137 N.J. Super. 570,350 A.2d 83 (Ch. Div. 1975), rev'd, 145 N.J. Super. 466,368
A.2d 381 (App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 74 N.J. 255,377 A.2d 661 (1977), relates the legal and political history of
the Newark residence ordinance and describes the chaotic lobbying efforts by police and firemen on the day the
New Jersey legislature exempted those two groups from all residence requirements. Id. at 586-87, 350 A.2d at
88-92.
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quirements has in some jurisdictions led to referenda banning them, some by
state constitutional provisions 5 and others by city charter amendments.
6
Elsewhere, municipalities continue to impose the requirements in jurisdic-
tions where they were previously unknown.7
Typically, municipal residence requirements command that either all or
certain classes of employees of the municipality maintain residence within the
municipality' as a condition of employment? Various modifying provisions
may lessen the potential harshness of the requirements in a particular jurisdic-
tion by making the requirement prospective only0 or by adding waiver provi-
sions," a reasonable time to comply with the rule,' 2 or an alternative to
establishing residence. 3 At least one city has attempted to ensure compliance
5. After the California Supreme Court upheld a municipal residence requirement in Ector v. City of
Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973), California voters amended the state constitu-
tion to limit a municipality's authority to impose residence requirements. The amendment provided: "A city or
county. . . may not require that its employees be residents of any such city or county... except that such
employees may be required to reside within a reasonable and specific distance of their place of employment or
other designated location." CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 10(b); see, e.g., Cooperrider v. San Francisco Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 97 Cal. App. 3d 495, 158 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1979); Lanam v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 80 Cal. App. 3d 315, 145
Cal. Rptr. 590 (1978). See also text accompanying notes 39-44 infra.
6. In 1967, Cleveland voters removed a residence requirement from that city's charter. City of Cleveland
ex rel. Kay v. Riebe, 46 Ohio Misc. 47, 48, 348 N.E.2d 156, 158 (C.P. 1976). Cleveland later reinstated the
requirement by ordinance. But see Chylik v. City of Cleveland, 59 Ohio App. 2d 305, 394 N.E.2d 1018 (1978)
(residence requirement invalid owing to conflict with city charter).
7. See, e.g., Jeske v. Upper Yoder Township, 44 Pa. Comnw. Ct. 13, 403 A.2d 1010 (1979).
8. Other local authorities, such as counties, townships, and school districts, also impose residence re-
quirements. Although this Comment deals primarily with municipalities, many of the arguments concerning the
requirements' validity are the same regardless of the governmental unit involved.
9. In some states, the imposition of a residence requirement may violate a city's statutory duty to bargain
collectively in good faith with a municipal employees union. Where the requirement is considered a condition of
employment, failure to bargain may result in invalidity of the requirement. See, e.g., City of New Haven v.
Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations, 39 Conn. Supp. 18, 410 A.2d 140 (1979); Hayford and Durkee,
Residency Requirements in Local Government Employment: The Impact of the Public Employer's Duty to
Bargain, 29 LAB. L.J. 343 (1978). However, the protection afforded by such a duty may be short-lived if the
municipality is allowed to bargain to an impasse and then, its duty to bargain met, proceed to adopt the
requirement. Id. at 347. See, e.g., Jeske v. Upper Yoder Township, 44 Pa. Commw. Ct. 13, 403 A.2d 1010
(1979).
10. CINCINNATI, OHIO, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE art. XVII, § 1 (1977), provides:
All persons hereafter appointed to positions in the city service shall be residents of the city of
Cincinnati at the time of their appointment and shall continue to maintain their primary place of
residence within the city at all times during their continued service with the city.
All persons now holding positions in the city service and residing within the city shall continue to
maintain their primary place of residence within the city at all times during their continued service with
the city.
All persons now holding positions in the city service not residing within the city shall, if they
change their primary place of residence, establish and maintain their primary place of residence within
the city at all times thereafter during their continued service with the city.
This ordinance was upheld in Buckley v. City of Cincinnati, 63 Ohio St. 2d 42, 406 N.E.2d 1106 (1980).
I1. See, e.g., the waiver provision in the Newark residence requirement, note 2 supra. The special circum-
stances waiver was held invalid for want of adequate standards in Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61,
319 A.2d 483 (1974).
12. Blanchester, Ohio, Ordinance No. 350, § 2 (1965), provides: "All present officers of the Police Depart-
ment ... who are not residents of the Village of Blanchester, must become residents or establish their residence
within two miles of said Village within six months of the effective date of this ordinance in order to continue to
hold their said positions.'" This requirement was held valid in Quigley v. Village of Blanchester, 16 Ohio App. 2d
104, 242 N.E.2d 589 (1968).
13. Blanchester, Ohio, Ordinance No. 350, § 2 (1965), provides a geographical proximity alternative. See
note 12 supra. See also text accompanying notes 39-44 infra. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 822-a (1976)
provides:
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by increasing the rule's harshness: a Cleveland, Ohio, ordinance imposes
personal liability on administrators for any compensation paid to a nonresi-
dent who was hired "recklessly and without using reasonable diligence to
ascertain the true facts concerning that person's bona fide place of resi-
dence."' 4 Some residence ordinances specifically define "residence,' 5 while
many others let courts decide what constitutes residence, 6 as well as the type
of evidence required to gauge compliance.
Proponents argue that residence requirements are vital to the preserva-
tion and improvement of the economy, safety, culture, and racial balance of
declining urban centers. The requirements, it is argued, not only improve
job performance by providing employees a sense of identity with the com-
munities they serve, but also bolster seriously threatened urban economies by
recirculating a municipality's dollars within the city limits through taxes and
spending.
Many employees have either sought to avoid application of the require-
ments to themselves t9 or attacked the requirements on constitutional or other
grounds.20 Most challengers have asserted that the residence requirements
[E]very person seeking employment with the city of New York or any of its agencies... shall sign an
agreement as a condition precedent to such employment to the effect that if he is or becomes a
nonresident ... during his employment by the city, he will pay to the city an amount by which a city
personal income tax on residents computed and determined as if he were a resident.., exceeds the
amount of any city earnings tax and city personal income tax imposed on him for the same taxable
period.
This taxation alternative was upheld in Watts v. McGuire, 102 Misc. 2d 711, 424 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1979), and
Legum v. Goldin, 99 Misc. 2d 654, 416 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1979).
14. CLEVELAND, OHIO, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 171.48. But see Chylik v. City of Cleveland, 59 Ohio
App. 2d 305, 394 N.E.2d 1018 (1978) (ordinance invalid owing to conflict with city charter).
15. See, e.g., the Newark residence requirement quoted in note 2 supra.
16. Mercadante v. City of Paterson, 111 N.J. Super. 35, 266 A.2d 611 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'dper curiam, 58
N.J. 112, 275 A.2d 440 (1971) (employee must maintain "real and principal residence" within city); Contento v.
Kohinke, 42 A.D.2d 1025, 348 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1973), appeal denied, 33 N.Y.2d 520, 353 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1974)
(municipal residence means "continual or at least extended physical presence at an abode within the town");
Goetz v. Borough of Zelienople, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 639, 324 A.2d 808 (1974) (ordinance requiring "full time
residence" does not mean residing in one place "all the time").
17. Miller v. Police Bd., 38 IlI. App. 3d 894, 349 N.E.2d 544 (1976) (city must prove violation by manifest
weight of the evidence); Choike v. City of Detroit, 94 Mich. App. 703, 290 N.W.2d 58 (1980) (city must prove
violation by competent, material, and substantial evidence).
18. See generally Albert, Residence Requirements: McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 40B
NAT'L INST. MUN. L. OFFICERS L. REV. 7 (1977); Hager, Residency Requirements for City Employees:
Important Incentives in Today's Urban Crisis, 18 URB. L. ANN. 197 (1980).
19. See, e.g., Ballf v. Public Welfare Dep't, 151 Cal. App. 2d 784, 312 P.2d 360 (1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 912 (1958); Denton v. City and County of San Francisco, 119 Cal. App. 2d 369, 260 P.2d 83 (1953); City of
Newport v. Schindler, 449 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1969); Milton v. Department of Civil Serv., 71 N.J. Super. 135, 176
A.2d 492 (App. Div. 1961).
20. For a list of cases holding municipal residence requirements valid against federal constitutional chal-
lenges, see note 23 infra. Only three courts have held the requirements invalid on federal constitutional grounds.
See note 21 infra.
Two states have invalidated municipal residence requirements on both federal and state constitutional
grounds. In Fraternal Order of Police, Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Hunter, 36 Ohio Misc. 103,303 N.E.2d 103
(C.P. 1973), a common pleas court held that enforcement of the Youngstown, Ohio, residence requirement
against persons employed before the enactment of the requirement violated state retroactivity laws, as well as
the contract clause (art. 1, § 10) of the United States Constitution, which prohibits state impairment of contract
obligations. Id. at 105-06, 303 N.E.2d at 105. The court also held that the requirement was unconstitutional as
applied prospectively because the city had introduced "no evidence of any kind from which the court could
determine the reasonableness of the rule." Id. at 108, 303 N.E.2d at 106-07. An appeals court affirmed the
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retroactivity holding but reversed in part the ruling on prospective application, declaring the requirement valid
as applied to police but invalid as applied to a municipal airport employee. Fraternal Order of Police,
Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Hunter, 49 Ohio App. 2d 185, 193-202, 360 N.E.2d 708, 712-18 (1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976). See text accompanying notes 82-87 infra.
In Donnelly v. City of Manchester, I ll N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971), the New Hampshire Supreme Court
invalidated on both federal and state constitutional grounds a Manchester residence requirement imposed on
school teachers. See text accompanying notes 67-71 infra. After the United States Supreme Court let stand a
Philadelphia residence requirement for firemen, McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645
(1976), Manchester revived its residence requirement. In Angwin v. City of Manchester, 118 N.H. 336, 386 A.2d
1272 (1978), the New Hampshire Supreme Court made clear that its Donnelly decision had been based in part on
state constitutional provisions and again held the requirement invalid: "We are not circumscribed by standards
set forth in McCarthy if we grant individuals more rights than are called for by federal constitutional
minima.... This we clearly have done." Id. at 337, 386 A.2d at 1273 (citations omitted).
Like New Hampshire, California affords its citizens greater protection than the federal constitution would
require. A 1974 amendment to the California Constitution strictly limits a municipality's authority to impose
residence requirements. See note 5 supra.
Other states have not been so protective. See Hattiesburg Firefighters Local 184 v. City of Hattiesburg, 263
So. 2d 767 (Miss. 1972) (municipal residence requirement does not violate state prohibition against ex post facto
laws); Buckley v. City of Cincinnati, 63 Ohio St. 2d 42, 406 N.E.2d 1106 (1980) (ordinance that requires city
employees who establish new residence to move within municipal limits not retroactive law); Jeske v. Upper
Yoder Township, 44 Pa. Commw. Ct. 13, 403 A.2d 1010 (1979) (township residence requirement not retroactive
condition of employment).
For decisions involving state authority grounds, see Cooper v. Green, 359 So. 2d 377 (Ala. 1978) (statute
that forbids making residence a prerequisite to employment does not forbid imposition of requirement for
officer); City of Atlanta v. Myers, 240 Ga. 261, 240 S.E.2d 60 (1977) (state statute prohibiting residence
requirements does not violate state constitution); Harvey Firemens Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 54 111. App. 3d 21,
369 N.E.2d 288 (1977) (statute that grants municipality authority to impose residence requirement for applicants
does not permit imposition of requirements on present employees); Wierenga v. Board of Fire and Police
Comm'rs, 40 Ill. App. 3d 270, 352 N.E.2d 322 (1976) (board of commissioners lacked authority to impose
residence requirements on present employees); Manion v. Kreml, 131 11. App. 2d 374, 264 N.E.2d 842 (1970)
(civil service statute did not affect police board's authority to impose residence requirement); Brown v. City of
Meridian, 370 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1979) (residence requirement invalid because not properly published and
recorded in ordinance book); Mandelkern v. City of Buffalo, 64 A.D.2d 279,409 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1978) (residence
requirement does not conflict with civil service statutory provision limiting dismissal to grounds of incompet-
ence or misconduct); Bland v. City of Wilmington, 278 N.C. 657, 180 S.E.2d 813 (1971) (city charter provision
that firemen must be eligible voters means voters in city election and, therefore, city residents); Chylik v. City of
Cleveland, 59 Ohio App. 2d 305, 394 N.E.2d 1018 (1978) (repeal of city charter residence provision implies intent
to limit city's authority to impose requirement); Bjorseth v. City of Seattle, 15 Wash. App. 797, 551 P.2d 1372
(1976), modified on other grounds, 17 Wash. App. 521, 563 P.2d 1320 (1977) (municipal system that provides for
lay-offs of nonresidents before residents invalid under statutory ban on residence requirements).
When residence requirements have been adopted but not enforced, estoppel claims have been raised. E.g.,
Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 772,577 P.2d 42 (1978) (city estopped from dismissing building inspector since
commissioners had promised to forego enforcement of residence requirement until new ordinance defined
"residence"); Municipal Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Myers, 348 So. 2d 1334 (La. App. 1977) (city not estopped from
enforcement of residence requirement when delay caused by city's study of the requirement's constitutionality);
Doris v. Police Comm'r, 374 Mass. 443, 373 N.E.2d 944 (1978) (lack of enforcement of residence requirement
does not alone raise implied assurances necessary for estoppel claim); Loiselle v. City of East Providence, 116
R.I. 585, 359 A.2d 345 (1976) (city's failure to enforce residence requirement for two years does not support
estoppel claim in case in which employee could not show detrimental reliance).
Several other cases involving residence requirements are worth noting: Cook County College Teachers
Union Local 1600 v. Taylor, 432 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Il1. 1977) (not violation of equal protection for city to
provide $3000 hardship allowance for administrative personnel but not for other employees when both classes
were forced to move residence to within city); Monti v. Flaherty, 351 F. Supp. 1136 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (an
employee's remedy is limited to reinstatement after discharge without a hearing for violation of residence
requirement); Plocher v. City of Highland, 59 Ill. App. 3d 697, 375 N.E.2d 1016 (1978) (employee who had been
dismissed for failure to comply with unauthorized retroactive residence requirement reinstated and given
damages equal to lost wages); City of Newport v. Schindler, 449 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1969) (declaratory judgment
that police officer is not an "officer" not affected by state constitutional residence requirement imposed on
"officers"); Michigan State Employees Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 91 Mich. App. 135, 283 N.W.2d 672 (1979)
(valid for department of natural resources to require park manager to reside in assigned house in state park but
invalid to charge rent); Grable v. City of Detroit, 48 Mich. App. 368,210 N.W.2d 379 (1973) (civil service hearing
officer required to consider personal hardship waiver to residence requirement); Buffet v. Municipal Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 58 A.D.2d 362, 396 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1977), aff'd mem., 45 N.Y.2d 1003,413 N.Y.S.2d 147,385 N.E.2d
1074 (1978) (court rejects residence requirement that was challenged by board of education on ground that
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violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution because
employment is permitted for a class of residents but denied to a class of
nonresidents. A few courts2' and most commentators22 have agreed with the
challengers, but the overwhelming majority of courts have upheld the require-
ments2
Whether a constitutional challenge to the validity of a municipal resi-
dence requirement succeeds depends upon the level of scrutiny applied. Use
of the deferential "rational basis test"'24 has, with one exception, resulted in
findings of validity .2 6 Commentators have argued that application of the more
demanding "strict scrutiny ' 27 analysis should result in invalidation of the
enough qualified teachers do not live within city); Kirkland v. Board of Educ., 49 A.D.2d 693,370 N.Y.S.2d 761
(1975) (abuse of discretion for trial judge to refuse dismissed employee permission to intervene in declaratory
action of which he had had no notice until after residence requirement upheld in summary judgment).
21. Hanson v. Unified School Dist. No. 500, 364 F. Supp. 330 (D. Kan. 1973); Donnelly v. City of
Manchester, I ll N.H. 50,274 A.2d 789 (1971); Fraternal Order of Police, Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Hunter,
49 Ohio App. 2d 185, 360 N.E.2d 708 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
22. Kramer, The Constitutionality of Post-Employment Residency Requirements, 9 URB. LAW. 157 (1977);
Comment, The Constitutionality of Residency Requirements for Municipal Employees, 24 EMORY L.J. 447
(1975); Note, Residency Requirements for Municipal Employees: Denial of a Right to Commute?, 7 U.S.F.L.
REV. 508 (1973); Comment, Municipal Employee Residence Requirements and the Right to Travel, 1975 WASH.
U.L.Q. 250; Note, Municipal Employee Residency Requirements and Equal Protection, 84 YALE L.J. 1684
(1975).
23. E.g., McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comn'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976); Lorenz v. Logue, 611 F.2d
421 (2d Cir. 1979); Andre v. Board of Trustees, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978);
Wardwell v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.
1975); Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Conn. 1979); Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F.
Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129,514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97
(1971), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 405 U.S. 950 (1972); Choike v. City of Detroit,
94 Mich. App. 703, 290 N.W.2d 58 (1980); Guttu v. City of East Grand Forks, 294 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 1980);
Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61,319 A.2d 483 (1974); Trainor v. City of Newark, 145 N.J. Super,
466, 368 A.2d 381 (App. Div. 1976) cert. denied, 74 N.J. 255,377 A.2d 661 (1977); Mandelkern v. City of Buffalo,
64 A.D.2d 279, 409 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1978); Malnes v. City of Greensboro, 300 N.C. 126, 265 S.E.2d 155 (1980);
Buckley v. City of Cincinnati, 63 Ohio St. 2d 42,406 N.E.2d 1106 (1980); City of Memphis v. IBEW Local 1288,
545 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. 1976).
24. Traditionally, equal protection analysis employs either of two standards of review. The first, the
"rational basis" or "rational relationship" test, is generally used to determine the validity of classifications
created by economic or social welfare legislation. Such classifications are valid if they rationally or arguably
relate to a legitimate function of government. Thus, a court will ask only whether it is conceivable that the
classification bears a rational relationship to a permissible government end. As long as there is an arguable
relationship, however remote, between the means and ends, a court will not invalidate the law. See generally J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (1978). See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297 (1976); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
The second equal protection standard, "strict scrutiny," applies whenever the legislation at issue (1)
impairs a person's exercise of a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, or (2) distinguishes between
persons on the basis of race or similarly "suspect" characteristics. Strict scrutiny requires that the classifica-
tions be necessary to serve a compelling governmental objective. This two-part test requires, first, a govern-
mental end of sufficient importance to justify unequal treatment of the classes involved; and second, a showing
that use of the classifications is the least drastic means available to serve those ends. If an alternative method of
serving the governmental objective would less significantly impair the rights of persons affected, the challenged
classifications will be held invalid. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 524 (1978). See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
25. Hanson v. Unified School Dist. No. 500, 364 F. Supp. 330 (D. Kan. 1973). See text accompanying notes
96-98 infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 32-62, 99-111 infra.
27. See note 24 supra.
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requirements,28 but as yet no court has applied such strict review.29
This Comment proposes that neither test adequately protects employees'
rights or municipal interests. A person's interests in choosing a community
and finding and maintaining employment merit constitutional protection. The
importance of these interests should trigger a meaningful review that affords
greater protection than would a rational basis test. Municipal residence
requirements should be held valid only if they substantially further important
governmental objectives.30 Only when a close -relationship exists between the
nature of the employment and the employee's residence within the municipal-
ity can the requirements be constitutionally imposed.3'
II. CONSTUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A. Early Cases-Application of the Rational Basis Test
The earliest cases involving municipal residence requirements dealt pri-
marily with application to a particular employee rather than with the consti-
tutionality of the requirements?2 Constitutional analysis was first applied to a
residence requirement in 1959 in Kennedy v. City of Newark,33 in which the
New Jersey Supreme Court applied a rational basis test and upheld the val-
idity of the requirement. The challenge was based on a provision of the state
constitution guaranteeing that "[a]ll persons are by nature free and indepen-
dent and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those
of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protec-
ting property. . . .,,34 The employees contended that the provision protected
a right to live where one chose without suffering loss of public employment.
The court held that the requirements rationally furthered the legitimate
governmental objectives of advancing the economy through increased tax
revenues and encouraging better job performance by increasing an em-
ployee's stake in the future of the city 5 The court framed the issue as "not
whether a man is free to live where he will. Rather the question is whether he
may live where he wishes and at the same time insist upon employment by
government., 36 The Kennedy court thus based its result on the belief that
28. Kramer, The Constitutionality of Post-Employment Residency Requirements, 9 URB. LAW. 157(1977);
Comment, The Constitutionality of Residency Requirements for Municipal Employees, 24 EMORY L.J. 447
(1975); Note, Residency Requirements for Municipal Employees: Denial of a Right to Commute?, 7 U.S.F.L.
REV. 508 (1973); Comment, Municipal Employee Residence Requirements and the Right to Travel, 1975 NVASH.
U.L.Q. 250.
29. Although some courts have required a showing of a compelling interest in the requirements, none has
yet examined the narrowness of the means, the second step in strict scrutiny analysis. See note 79 and text
accompanying notes 79-81 infra.
30. See text accompanying notes 141-77 infra.
31. See text accompanying notes 178-222 infra.
32. See note 4 supra.
33. 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959).
34. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1.
35. 29 N.J. 178, 184, 148 A.2d 473, 476 (1959).
36. Id. at 183, 148 A.2d at 476.
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public employment is a privilege, not a right37 Several courts have since
rejected this approach 8
A year later in Marablito v. Town of Emeryville39 police and firemen
argued that residence could not be a qualification for employment because it
bore no reasonable relation to the performance of official duties. Although the
California appeals court did not identify the challenge as a constitutional one,
it applied a rational basis test4° and held the requirement reasonably related to
ensuring that police and firemen could respond quickly to emergencies.
4
'
Emergency availability of safety personnel has served as justification for
municipal residence requirements in a number of cases, regardless of the level
of scrutiny employed.4 2 It has been suggested that a municipality's need for
readily available personnel would be better served by a geographical proxim-
ity requirement, one that directs an employee to reside within a specified
number of miles from his place of duty.4 3 Although no court has found this
alternative mandated by the federal constitution, at least one state constitu-
tion has limited municipalities to use of geographical proximity require-
ments. 4
37. Accord, Berg v. City of Minneapolis, 274 Minn. 277, 143 N.W.2d 200 (1966); Mercadante v. City of
Paterson, 111 N.J. Super. 35,266 A.2d 611 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'dper curiam, 58 N.J. 112,275 A.2d440 (1971).
38. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the United States Supreme Court declared "Mhis
Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is
characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege."' Id. at 374 (citations omitted). In Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F.
Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972), a municipal residence requirement survived a "compelling interest" test; however, the
court specifically rejected the Kennedy court's reliance on right/privilege distinctions as justification for resi-
dence requirements: "The New Jersey courts have relied upon this right-privilege doctrine . .. to uphold state
laws and municipal ordinances requiring public servants to reside in the municipality which pays their salaries.
[citing Kennedy and Mercadante] ... Any reliance upon [this] outdated, and apparently unconstitutional
[theory] is disavowed by this court." Id. at 499 n.4 (citations omitted). Accord, Hanson v. Unified School Dist.
No. 500, 364 F. Supp. 330 (D. Kan. 1973); Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971).
The Supreme Court has consistently held that government cannot impair the exercise of a constitutionally
protected activity by imposition of conditions on employment. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)
(invalid to use threat of dismissal to obtain self-incriminating statements from police officers); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state cannot deny unemployment benefits to sabbatarian who is unwilling because
of religious scruples to accept offered Saturday employment). See also Hager, Residency Requirements for City
Employees: Important Incentives in Today's Urban Crisis, 18 URB. L. ANN. 197, 206-07 (1980); Note, Resi-
dency Requirements for Municipal Employees: Denial of a Right to Commute?, 7 U.S.F.L. REV. 508, 523-26
(1973).
39. 183 Cal. App. 2d 406, 6 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1960).
40. Use of the rational basis test is not limited to issues of equal protection. A similar test is employed to
test the validity of municipal ordinances: a municipality is presumed to have no state authority to pass un-
reasonable laws. See generally 5 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 333-400 (1969 & Supp. 1979).
41. 183 Cal. App. 2d 406, 410-11, 6 Cal. Rptr. 690, 692-93 (1960).
42. E.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971), appeal
dismissed for want of a substantialfederal question, 405 U.S. 950 (1972); Quigley v. Village of Blanchester, 16
Ohio App. 2d 104, 242 N.E.2d 589 (1968).
43. Note, Residency Requirements for Municipal Employees: Denial of a Right to Commute?, 7 U.S.F.L.
REV. 508, 535-36 (1973).
44. See note 5 supra. An Ohio appeals court discussed the advisability of measuring the extent of a
proximity requirement by time, rather than miles, in Fraternal Order of Police, Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v.
Hunter, 49 Ohio App. 2d 185, 200-01, 360 N.E.2d 708, 717-18 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976). A
statutory geographical proximity requirement survived an equal protection challenge in Doris v. Police
Comm'n, 374 Mass. 443, 373 N.E.2d 944 (1978). See also Burke v. Chief of Police, 374 Mass. 450, 373 N.E.2d
949 (1978) (measurement of ten mile radius geographical proximity requirement by "air miles" rather than
"highway miles").
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In 1961 the Supreme Court of Michigan in State, County, and Municipal
Employees Local 339 v. City of Highland Park4 avoided questioning the
validity of a municipal residence requirement itself by holding that the ques-
tioned requirement's enforcement was unconstitutional owing to local
housing conditions that made compliance a severe hardship. The ordinance
required all municipal employees to establish residence within Highland Park
within ninety days. Most of the 163 nonresident plaintiffs were low-income
hospital workers. Noting that the city, a largely industrial area, could not
adequately provide affordable housing for all the nonresidents, the court
determined that application of the requirement in this instance was arbitrary
and unreasonable, regardless of whether the requirement itself was valid.
In 1969 in Salt Lake City Firefighters Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City47
firemen challenged an ordinance that (1) required new applicants for employ-
ment to be residents; (2) imposed a continuing residence requirement on
current employees who were already residents; and (3) required that current
employees who lived outside a fifteen-mile radius from downtown move into
the city within two years. The Utah Supreme Court held that the geographical
proximity requirement reasonably served the purpose of making residence
requirements for all city employees uniform.48 The court also outlined a
"public coffer" theory for economic justification of the requirements, finding
that the ordinance was reasonable "not only for the city's convenience and
economical operation, but conceivably to have those whom it helps clothe
and feed participate in and contribute support and taxes for its benefit,--not
for that of cities elsewhere.- 49 This public coffer theory suggests that an
employee's salary ought to circulate within the economy of the municipality
that provides that salary, thus limiting to residents the benefit of the munic-
ipality's funds. 0 Several courts have since expressly rejected the public
coffer theory as justification for municipal residence requirements.5'
Both substantive due process and equal protection challenges to a resi-
dence requirement failed in 1970 in Williams v. Civil Service Commission of
Detroit,5 2 in which the Michigan Supreme Court approved a lower court's use
of a reasonableness standard to test the requirements on both constitutional
grounds. The lower court had found reasonable the belief that "local resi-
dence tends to make a person a better municipal employee" and that "the
encouragement of local citizen service in municipal government is a desirable
end in itself.",
53
45. 363 Mich. 79, 108 N.W.2d 898 (1961).
46. Id. at 86-87, 108 N.W.2d at 901.
47. 22 Utah 2d 115, 449 P.2d 239 (1969).
48. Id. at 117, 449 P.2d at 240. See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
49. 22 Utah 2d 115, 117, 449 P.2d 239, 240 (1969).
50. See People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, aff'd sub nom. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195
(1915).
51. Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 498 n.4 (D.N.J. 1973); Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111
N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971). See text accompanying note 74 infra.
52. 383 Mich. 507, 176 N.W.2d 593 (1970).
53. Id. at 514-15, 176 N.W.2d at 596.
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One year later in Detroit Police Officers Association v. City of Detroit54
the Michigan Supreme Court again applied a rational basis test and held valid
an ordinance that imposed a residence requirement on all employees but
excluded police from certain waiver provisions5 The court said that the
distinction between police and other employees not only bore a reasonable
relationship to permissible government ends, but also was legitimately based
on "natural distinguishing characteristics" of the police officer's job! 6 The
court noted the importance of a good relationship between the police and the
communities they serve, as well as the importance of a policeman's availabil-
ity for emergency duty.5 7 One justice also recognized in the requirement a
permissible attempt to reduce the racial tensions engendered in part by the
hiring of police from predominantly white suburbs to patrol largely black
Detroit neighborhoods, saying the requirement could serve to increase the
number of black policemen and "promote a feeling of trust, confidence, and
fraternity between the people of Detroit and their police department." 58
Detroit Police Officers Association was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, which in 1972 dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial
federal question 9 Later that year the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Ahern v. Murphy6° dealt with a policeman's challenge to a Chicago municipal
residence requirement but limited arguments to "whether the United States
Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal [of Detroit Police Officers Associa-
tion] was dispositive of this appeal or merely persuasive."-6 ' The Seventh
Circuit held that the Supreme Court's dismissal was a "decision on the merits
of the case appealed"-that is, "fully equivalent to affirmance"-and, there-
fore, affirmed dismissal of the Chicago policeman's complaint.62
B. Right of Travel Cases-Application of the Compelling
Interest Test
After the United States Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson63 recog-
nized a constitutional right of travel, many challengers demanded that courts
54. 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 405
U.S. 950 (1972).
55. Id. at 523, 190 N.W.2d at 97-98. Although discrimination in the waiver provisions for the two classes of
employees was at issue, the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion and the United States Supreme Court's subse-
quent dismissal of appeal for want of a substantial federal question have been cited by courts and commentators
alike as authority for the validity of the requirements themselves. See McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976); Wardwell v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976); Wright v. City of
Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975); Ahem v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972); Ector v. City of Torrance,
10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973); Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d
483 (1974); Hager, Residency Requirements for City Employees: Important Incentives in Today's Urban Crisis,
18 URB. L. ANN. 197 (1980); Comment, The Constitutionality of Residency Requirements for Municipal
Employees, 24 EMORY L.J. 447 (1975).
56. 385 Mich. 519, 522, 190 N.W.2d 97, 97 (1971).
57. Id. at 522-23, 190 N.W.2d at 97-98.
58. Id. at 524, 190 N.W.2d at 98 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
60. 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972).
61. Id. at 364.
62. Id. (citations omitted).
63. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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invoke strict scrutiny analysis for review of municipal residence requirements.
Shapiro had held invalid three statutes that denied welfare benefits to persons
who had resided in a jurisdiction for less than one year. The Court used a
"compelling interest" standard for equal protection challenges to legislation
that impairs a fundamental right, holding that such classifications are invalid
unless they are "necessary to promote a compelling governmental inter-
est."64 The compelling interest test of Shapiro is indistinguishable from the
strict scrutiny traditionally reserved for suspect classifications. Either test
requires two findings: (1) that the legislation is designed to serve a very
important governmental objective and (2) that the means chosen are the least
drastic method of serving that objective. 65 Because Shapiro had invalidated a
durational residence requirement for welfare benefits on the basis of the
requirement's effect on the fundamental right of travel, many challengers to
municipal residence requirements sought to apply the compelling interest
standard to ordinances that impaired travel between home and employment.
In 1971 in Donnelly v. City of Manchester67 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire announced that the compelling interest standard was the appro-
priate test for a municipal residence case but applied a balancing test rather
than Shapiro's two-step strict scrutiny analysis. Having determined that
"[t]he right of every citizen to live where he chooses and to travel freely not
only within the state but across its borders is a fundamental
right... guaranteed" by the New Hampshire and federal constitutions,6 the
court weighed the residence requirement's public benefit against the serious-
ness of the fundamental right's impairment.69 The court found that no govern-
mental interest would justify imposing the requirement on a school teacher
but left unanswered the question of whether a residence requirement could be
valid for other employees.70 Economic justifications were expressly
rejected.7'
One year later in Krzewinski v. Kugler72 a three-judge federal district
court reviewed a New Jersey statute that imposed a municipal residence
requirement on police and firemen and held that although the Shapiro com-
pelling interest test applied, compelling governmental objectives did exist to
64. Id. at 634.
65. See note 24 supra.
66. The notion of the right of travel has been questioned recently in Berger, Residence Requirements for
Welfare and Voting: A Post-Mortem, 42 OHIO Sr. L.J. 853 (1981).
67. 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971).
68. Id. at 51, 274 A.2d at 791.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 52, 274 A.2d at 791.
71. Id. at 52-53, 274 A.2d at 791-92. The court stated:
It has been argued that those who are employed by the city should help support the cost of their
employment by contributing to the economy of the city and to its tax base. But employees of the city
earn their salaries, and any governmental interest in compelling them to be residents for whatever
financial benefit there may be to the city ... is slight compared to the important interference with their
private rights.
Id.
72. 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972).
[Vol. 43:195
MUNICIPAL RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
justify burdening the employee's right of travel. The court said it would up-
hold the statute "only if the state is able to demonstrate a compelling interest
in maintaining the difference in treatment between the classes ' 73 and then
summarily rejected the public coffer theory and right/privilege distinction
justifications as being not only less than compelling, but unconstitutional in
themselves 4
However, the Krzewinski court found compelling the municipality's
interest in addressing the "modem pattern of urban disruption and dissipation
prevalant [sic] today., 75 The court held that the requirements were part of
justifiable efforts to engender in the police officers a personal commitment to
the city's future, to dispel the prejudices of citizens and police, and to avoid
the appearance that outsiders were brought into the city to impose law and
order on its poor and minority residents. 6 The court further noted that a
resident policeman is more often present within the city during his off-duty
time and, therefore, more readily available to assume duty when an emerg-
ency or a "chance observation" requires official action.w The court found no
important differences between police and firemen that would serve to exempt
the latter from the requirements.
78
Krzewinski requires a showing of compelling government interests, but
the test differs from that applied in Shapiro. Although the Krzewinski court
identified compelling interests, the means were not examined under Shapiro's
requirement that they be the least drastic method available to serve those
interests. Rather, the court applied a balancing test akin to that used in
Donnelly and concluded that the need for municipal employees with a sense of
community identity and a presence within the city for emergencies out-
weighed the employees' interest in their fundamental right of travel?9 The
community identity objective could have been served by less drastic means-
for example, participation in educational programs or community affairs and
organizations. Emergency availability is best served by a geographical prox-
imity requirement based on travel time to job.80 Nevertheless, no more
precise means exist to assure a presence to make "chance observations";
such an immediate service to the city must by the terms of the objective be an
incident of residence. However, the Krzewinski court did not discuss in any
73. Id. at 497.
74. The court noted that Shapiro had expressly rejected the theory that a municipality may preserve its
funds for its own residents. After describing the public coffer theory as a "natural outgrowth" of viewing public
employment as a privilege rather than a right, the court made clear its disapproval: "Any reliance upon these
outdated, and apparently unconstitutional theories is disavowed by this Court." Id. at 499 n.4. See text
accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
75. 338 F. Supp. 492, 499 (D.N.J. 1972).
76. Id. at 499-500.
77. Id. at 500.
78. Id. at 500-01.
79. Language in the Krzewinski court's discussion indicates that it believed the Court in Shapiro had applied
something of a balancing test: "In [Shapiro] the state interest lay in determining bona fide r sidency, an interest
clearly outn'eighed by Shapiro's need for welfare payments . Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
80. See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
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detail these distinctions among means, and it seems unlikely that the court
was engaged in an implied scrutiny of the means. Donnelly and Krzewinski are
consistent in one additional respect: both courts determined the outcome of
the balance by considering the particular characteristics of the affected
employees' duties.
8
'
In Fraternal Order of Police, Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Huntern2 an
Ohio appeals court found the Krzewinski test appropriate and held a
Youngstown residence requirement valid as applied prospectively to police.83
A lower court had held the requirement invalid because the city had produced
"no evidence of any kind from which the court could determine the reason-
ableness of this rule. ' 84 The appeals court agreed that "there is absolutely
nothing in the record" to demonstrate what compelling interests existed 85 but
nevertheless "[took] judicial notice that there is a compelling reason to re-
quire safety personnel to reside within the proximity to their duty station.86
However, the appellate court further noted that for other employees there
must be an established factual basis to support a conclusion that compelling
interests are served by a residence requirement and consequently held invalid
the application of the Youngstown requirement to a municipal airport em-
ployee whose residence outside the city was closer to the airport than it would
have been had he resided in Youngstown.87
C. Limits to the Right of Travel Analysis-The Rational
Basis Standard
Despite the use of the compelling interest test in these cases, most courts
continue to apply the rational basis test 8 Justification for the return to the
lesser standard is said to lie in two other right of travel cases, Dunn v.
Blumstein89 and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.90 In Dunn the
Supreme Court invalidated a durational residence requirement for voting in
local elections. The Court held that a one-year waiting period was not the
least restrictive means of serving Tennessee's compelling interest in the
prevention of voter fraud.9' In dictum, the Court cautioned that it intended to
cast no doubt on the validity of a requirement that a voter be a resident at the
time of an election?" In Memorial Hospital the Court again employed strict
scrutiny and held invalid an Arizona statute that imposed a one-year resi-
81. See text accompanying notes 193-202 infra.
82. 49 Ohio App. 2d 185, 360 N.E.2d 708 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
83. Id. at 199-200, 360 N.E.2d at 716-17.
84. 36 Ohio Misc. 103, 108, 303 N.E.2d 103, 106-07 (1973), rev'dinpart, 49 Ohio App. 2d 185,360 N.E.2d
708 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
85. 49 Ohio App. 2d 185, 198-99, 360 N.E.2d 708, 716-17 (1975).
86. Id. at 200, 360 N.E.2d at 717.
87. Id. at 201-02, 360 N.E.2d at 718.
88. See, e.g., cases cited in note 23 supra.
89. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
90. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
91. 405 U.S. 330, 353 (1972).
92. Id. at 342 n. 13.
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dence requirement on an indigent's receipt of free, nonemergency medical
care or hospitalization. 93 Justice Marshall's majority opinion echoed Dunn's
caveat limiting right of travel analysis to durational requirements and further
explained that the fundamental right protected was not a right of movement,
but of migration: "Even a bona fide residence requirement would burden the
right of travel, if travel meant merely movement."' Marshall pointed out that
the fundamental right concerned only a person's movement "to migrate,
resettle, find a new job, and start a new life." 95
In Hanson v. Unified School District No. 500,96 decided in the interval
between the Dunn and Memorial Hospital opinions, a federal district court
took note of the Dunn caveat but did not decide whether a residence require-
ment imposed on school teachers impaired any fundamental right that would
justify use of a compelling interest test.97 Rather, the court held that the
requirement was invalid under either equal protection standard "because the
classification of residents versus non-residents.., is essentially arbitrary
and does not rest upon any reasonable basis."9
After Memorial Hospital two federal courts of appeals approved evalua-
tion of municipal residence requirements by a rational basis test?9 In 1975 in
Wright v. City of Jackson" the Fifth Circuit rejected firemen's claims that a
local residence requirement violated their fundamental travel rights. The Fifth
Circuit noted the Dunn and Memorial Hospital limitations on right of travel
analysis. The court also drew a distinction between travel intrastate and
interstate and held that only the latter was protected by a compelling interest
standard.'0 ' The Wright opinion also took note of the Seventh Circuit's inter-
pretation of the Supreme Court's dismissal of Detroit Police Officers Associa-
tion.'0 2 All of these reasons, the Fifth Circuit declared, justified a return to
evaluation of municipal residence requirements by the lower standard.' 3 In
1976 in Wardwell v. Board of Education'0 4 the Sixth Circuit echoed the Wright
court's analysis and denied a school teacher's request that the court enjoin
enforcement of a Cincinnati residence requirement.' 5 The court applied a
rational basis test and found the requirement rationally related to improve-
ment of teachers' community identity and involvement.'06
93. 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974).
94. Id. at 255.
95. Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969)).
96. 364 F. Supp. 330 (D. Kan. 1973).
97. Id. at 333-34.
98. Id. at 334.
99. Wardwell v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th
Cir. 1975).
100. 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
101. Id. at 902.
102. Id. at 903 (citing Ahem v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972), as interpreting the Supreme Court's
dismissal of Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit for want of a substantial federal question as a
decision on the merits). See also text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
103. 506 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1975).
104. 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
105. Id. at 627-28.
106. Id. at 628.
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In 1976 the Supreme Court seemingly approved the return to a rational
basis test in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission,'07 a brief
per curiam opinion announcing a decision based on jurisdictional statements
alone. McCarthy, a sixteen-year veteran of the Philadelphia Fire Department,
was dismissed for violation of a residence requirement. Slightly more than
one year before his dismissal, McCarthy's wife had moved with their children
to the family's summer home in New Jersey to avoid neighborhood violence
that had resulted in beatings of their children."" Several months later,
because of vandalism, McCarthy sold the Philadelphia house and moved into
his mother's house, also in Philadelphia.' °9 Although he voted, received mail,
and stayed two nights a week at his mother's house, the Philadelphia Civil
Service Commission determined that because his family resided in New
Jersey, McCarthy resided there also."0 A commonwealth court sustained his
dismissal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review, and McCarthy
appealed to the Supreme Court."'
The Court did not explicitly identify any standard of review but did imply
that its earlier dismissal of Detroit Police Officers Association could be con-
sidered a holding that "this kind of ordinance is not irrational." ' 2 It cited as
further support the Sixth Circuit's Wardwell opinion."3 The Court noted that
it had yet to address the question of whether such a residence requirement
impaired the right of travel as defined in Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial
Hospital and said:
Each of those cases involved a statutory requirement of residence in the state for
at least one year before becoming eligible either to vote, as in Dunn, or to receive
welfare benefits, as in Shapiro and Memorial Hospital. Neither in those cases, nor
in any others, have we questioned the validity of a condition placed upon munici-
pal employment that a person be a resident at the time of his application. In this
case appellant claims a constitutional right to be employed by the city of Philadel-
phia while he is living elsewhere. There is no support in our cases for such a
claim. "
4
The opinion went on to quote Dunn's distinction between durational require-
ments and "appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence
requirements" and concluded that the Philadelphia ordinance was of the latter
kind.'
In McCarthy the Court established the validity of municipal residence
requirements by doing little more than announcing that it had never ques-
107. 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam).
108. Jurisdictional Statement at 6, McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976).
109. Id.
110. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 3, McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645
(1976).
111. 424 U.S. 645, 645 (1976).
112. Id. at 646 (citations omitted).
113. Id. (citing Wardwell v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976)).
114. Id. at 646-47 (footnotes omitted).
.115. Id. at 647. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and Blackmun would have noted probable
jurisdiction and set the case for argument. Id.
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tioned their validity before. The opinion approved one city's requirement
without clearly articulating a standard or showing how that standard applied
to the terms of the ordinance. It implied a rational basis test by noting that the
requirement was "not irrational" but named no legitimate purposes that were
rationally furthered. At most, the Court implicitly announced three pre-
requisites to validity-that the requirements be "appropriately defined,"
"uniformly applied," and "bona fide"-without hinting at their meanings.
"Uniform application" could mean that the requirement must burden equally
all city employees or merely all firemen. "Appropriate definition" may
require that ordinances be especially precise or simply not unusually vague.
What meaning "bona fide" may have apart from "valid" is difficult to ascer-
tain, unless perhaps the Court intended to prohibit informally adopted re-
quirements but to allow those imposed according to official legislative proce-
dures."6 Such a prerequisite would lessen an administrator's opportunity to
use violation of a residence requirement as a pretext for dismissal of an
unpopular or politically threatening employee."1
7
However, despite its shortcomings in failing to identify the appropriate
standard of review, the McCarthy opinion does resolve one issue: if any right
is impaired by a municipal residence requirement, it is not the fundamental
right of travel. Lower courts have held this to be its clear import. Although
employees continue to challenge the requirements on federal right of travel
grounds, since 1976, the courts that have directly addressed those grounds
have rejected them on the basis of McCarthy.!8
The Court's assertion that the fundamental right of travel is not impaired
by a municipal residence requirement is correct for two reasons. First, the
right of travel protects a person's interest in pulling up stakes, starting anew,
and leaving life in one place for life in another; it is a migration right, and as
such offers no support to an emigrant's expectation of taking his job along
with him. As applied to restrictions on employment, the right of travel should
protect a person's right to apply for and begin ajob in the place he chooses. A
municipal residence requirement does nothing to impair that right; unless the
requirement has a durational element, it imposes no special hardship on a
person's finding a city offering employment and his moving there to qualify
for a job."9
116. A municipality possesses only such power as is delegated to it by state government. Unless it is
specifically authorized to impose a residence requirement or unless broad powers to set qualifications are
granted, a municipality may violate state constitutional provisions or the municipality's enabling legislation if it
requires its employees to maintain or establish residence within the city. See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Myers, 240
Ga. 261, 240 S.E.2d 60 (1977); Manion v. Kreml, 131 Ill. App. 2d 374, 264 N.E.2d 842 (1970); Mandelkem v. City
of Buffalo, 64 A.D.2d 279, 409 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1978). A municipality's failure to follow legislatively mandated
procedure in publishing and recording a residence ordinance may also invalidate the requirement. See Brown v.
City of Meridian, 370 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1979).
117. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
118. See, e.g., Lorenz v. Logue, 611 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1979); Andre v. Board of Trustees, 561 F.2d48 (7th
Cir. 1977); Buckley v. City of Cincinnati, 63 Ohio St. 2d 42, 406 N.E.2d 1106 (1980).
119. There is even less burden in ajurisdiction that allows a reasonable time after beginning employment in
which to comply with the requirement. See, for example, the Blanchester ordinance cited in note 12 supra.
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Second, even if the right of travel is affected, strict scrutiny applies only
if the requirement impairs the exercise of another fundamental right, such as
voting,20 or penalizes migration by denying a "necessity of life."' 2  Thus,
absent a high degree of burden or penalty, the impairment of the right is not
severe enough to trigger the stricter standard. To date, the Court has not
extended the protection afforded necessities beyond welfare benefits; no
cases appear to hold public employment such a necessity.'2 Therefore, the
Court has correctly withheld strict scrutiny analysis. Regardless of whether
McCarthy held that a municipal residence requirement penalizes migration
too little or not at all, either holding presents a valid reason for denying an
employee or a nonresident the benefit of the Shapiro standard.
The Court's rejection of the right of travel claim does not, however,
provide a satisfactory resolution to the issue of the Philadelphia require-
ment's validity, for the Court failed to discuss whether other important
personal interests were impaired. Several of the Court's decisions have
accorded significant personal interests more meaningful protection than a
traditional rational basis test would offer. 23 In McCarthy the Court did not
discuss, and the parties did not argue, the existence of other fundamental or
significant rights or the application of an intermediate standard of review.
Careful analysis of existing cases reveals two such important rights, as well as
a standard that offers them meaningful protection.
HI. THE RIGHTS IMPAIRED
Unlike a toll'24 or an immigration restriction,'2 a municipal residence
requirement affects one's right of travel only indirectly; it does not halt a
person's actual freedom of movement between a city and its suburbs. What
most likely lies at the heart of an employee's complaint is the imposition of an
unfair choice: a municipal employee must decide whether he values more
highly his job or his home.'26 If he chooses to protect his job, he loses the right
to continue residing not only in a particular house, but in a preferred neighbor-
hood as well-often among friends and family, and close to a church, schools,
120. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
121. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974).
122. Several cases do indicate that more demanding scrutiny will apply when conditions placed on employ-
ment affect an employee's exercise of first or fifth amendment rights. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976);
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474 (1959). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
123. See text accompanying notes 139-51 infra.
124. Justice Rehnquist's lone dissenting opinion in Memorial Hospital noted: "TiThe toll exacted from
persons crossing from Delaware to New Jersey by the Delaware Memorial Bridge is a 'penalty' on interstate
travel in the most literal sense of all. But such charges... have been upheld by this Court against attacks based
upon the right to travel." 415 U.S. 250, 284 (1974) (footnote omitted).
125. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (valid for federal government to prohibit citizens from
traveling to Cuba).
126. In Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975), a group of nonresident firemen brought a
class action challenging the validity of a Jackson, Mississippi, residence requirement. The plaintiffs alleged that
"the ordinance denies them their right to travel, their right to choose a residence, or, in the alternative, their
right to employment .... " Id. at 901.
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and associations in whose affairs he is involved. If he chooses instead to
protect his choice of community, he must forego an opportunity to seek or
maintain preferred employment.
A broad reading of McCarthy suggests that the Supreme Court has
rejected the existence of any fundamental right, even apart from the right of
travel, to continue holding a job while living in the neighborhood of one's
choice. 2 7 The Court's statement that "[t]here is no support in our cases for
such a claim" could rule out all possible claims to constitutional protection, if
by "our cases" the Court refers to all its decisions. A fundamental right is by
definition so important that a majority of Justices should seldom fail to recog-
nize its impairment.' 28 It is quite possible that in McCarthy the Court con-
sidered all other rights that might be deemed fundamental and found none
impaired. But it is also possible that "our cases" referred only to the right of
travel cases that the Court cited. Because McCarthy was decided without
benefit of briefs or arguments, fundamental rights other than the right of travel
were perhaps not fully considered.
There is only slight utility in arguing that a fundamental right exists.
Although the Court has identified several fundamental rights,'29 the Justices
have not agreed on where these rights can be found. In perhaps the most
thoroughly explained fundamental rights case, Griswold v. Connecticut,'
30
Justice Douglas' majority opinion found a fundamental right of privacy in the
"penumbras" of several Bill of Rights guarantees sufficient to invalidate a
statute that made the use of contraceptives a crime.' 3' Unfortunately, he
failed to explain precisely how the right was located. 32 In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Goldberg noted that the ninth amendment 33 created no rights but
did authorize the Court to identify others not expressly named in the Constitu-
tion. 34 He further suggested that federal judges look for fundamental rights,
not in their personal beliefs, but in the traditions and conscience of the
American people. 35 Justice Harlan, also concurring, indicated that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects "basic values 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.' , 36 Later cases have added little to these
vague explanations of where and how the Court has identified fundamental
127. See quotation in text accompanying note 114 supra.
128. See text accompanying notes 129-39 infra.
129. The Court has identified the following fundamental rights: freedom of association, NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); freedom of participation in the electoral process, Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); right of travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); right of
privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); right of access to courts, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977); and an implied right of procedural fairness in criminal appeals, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963).
130. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
131. Id. at 484-86.
132. Id.
133. The ninth amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
134. 381 U.S. 475, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 493-94.
136. Id. at 500 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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rights. For example, no specific source of the right of travel has been named, al-
though the Court has on occasion implied that its source is in the privileges and
immunities and commerce clauses.'37
It is difficult to determine, without more explicit guidelines, where basic
values, traditions, and penumbras are found, other than in a judge's personal
view of what should be a fundamental right: "[F]undamental rights analysis is
simply no more than the modern recognition of ... natural law con-
cepts...." At most, a nonresident employee might argue that his right to
live in the community of his choice has been both assumed and so highly
valued in American society that it must be regarded as fundamental. One
proponent of strict scrutiny of municipal residence requirements has made
just such an argument.'39
This Comment proceeds on the assumption that McCarthy rejected the
existence of any fundamental right to either employment or maintenance of a
home in a chosen community, in part because it is highly unlikely that the
Court would simply overlook other fundamental rights and in part because of
the appropriateness of a less exacting standard than strict scrutiny.'4° There-
fore, a municipal employee challenging a residence requirement must demon-
strate constitutional protection based on something other than the funda-
mental rights strain of equal protection. To succeed, he must show that his
personal interests in employment and community are sufficiently important to
merit greater protection than traditional equal protection standards afford
rights that are deemed less than fundamental.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD
A. The Intermediate Standard for Equal Protection Cases
Recent equal protection cases have indicated that a personal interest
need not be deemed fundamental in order to merit meaningful protection.
Traditionally, under the rigid two-tiered system of applying either strict
scrutiny or a rational basis test, a right deemed less than fundamental has
been protected by the latter, a test that has been aptly described as "minimal
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact."'' 4' In recent years, however,
several Justices have displayed discomfort with the two-tiered equal protec-
tion analysis. 42 Commentators have noted that the Court has in the past
137. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88
(1971); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
138. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTrUTIONAL LAW 416 (1978).
139. Kramer, The Constitutionality of Post-Employment Residency Requirements, 9 URB. LAW. 157,
168-72 (1977).
140. See text accompanying notes 141-79 infra.
141. Gunther, Foreword: In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:A Modelfora NewerEqual
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
142. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), Justice Steyens criticized traditional equal protection analysis:
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered analysis of equal protection
claims does not describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the
[Vol. 43:195
1982] MUNICIPAL RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS 213
decade made increasing use of different standards of review of varying
degrees of strictness. 43 While in the past the Court may have hypothesized a
legitimate purpose for challenged legislation,' 44 it now frequently demands
that the espoused purpose be currently articulated, not a hindsight rationaliza-
tion. 45 Furthermore, the Court has begun using an intermediate standard of
review for special cases involving classifications of illegitimacy, gender, age,
and handicap.' 6
Professor Tribe has identified two circumstances that trigger this inter-
mediate review:
First, intermediate scrutiny has been triggered if important, though not necessarily
"fundamental" or "preferred" interests are at stake.... [E]ither a significant
interference with liberty or a denial of a benefit vital to the individual triggers
intermediate review.... Second, [this standard applies] if sensitive, although not
necessarily suspect, criteria of classification are employed. 147
Thus, the Court scrutinizes carefully legislation that impairs important or
significant rights that could be deemed "semi-fundamental" or employs
"semi-suspect" classifications. To date, however, the Court has explicitly
articulated the standard only in gender discrimination cases.
Eight months after McCarthy in Craig v. Boren48 the Court invalidated
an Oklahoma statute that restricted the sale of 3.2 percent beer to men at least
twenty-one years old and women at least eighteen. Strict scrutiny was inap-
Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent
fashion.
Id. at 212. However, he did not delineate that "single standard."
Justice Marshall has expressed increasing discontent with two-tiered analysis. Unlike Justice Stevens, who
perceives a single standard, Justice Marshall finds many:
I must once more voice my disagreement with the Court's rigidified approach to equal protection
analysis. The Court apparently seeks to establsh... that equal protection cases fall into one of two
neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review-strict scrutiny or mere rationality.
But this Court's decisions in the field of equal protection defy such easy categorization. A principled
reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends
variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depend-
ing, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). See also Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White has apparently endorsed much of Justice Marshall's analysis:
"[I]t is clear that we employ not just one, or two, but, as my Brother Marshall has so ably demonstrated, a
'spectrum of standards.' Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
143. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1082-89 (1978); Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 20-25 (1972); Simpson, A Method of Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Protection Clause, 29
STAN. L. REV. 663, 678-- 1 (1977); Treiman, Equal Protection and Fundamental Rights-A Judicial Shell
Game, 15 TULSA L.J. 183, 193-95 (1979).
144. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
145. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
146. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1057-82, 1089 (1978).
147. Id. at 1089-90 (footnotes omitted).
148. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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propriate because the classifications involved neither a suspect class 49 nor
any fundamental right' 50 ' The statute would have survived a rational basis
test. An Oklahoma survey had shown statistical differences between the
drunk-driving arrest records of men and women in the eighteen- to twenty-
year-old group. The Oklahoma legislature could have rationally believed that
the state's interest in traffic safety would be served by denying 3.2 percent
beer to males under age twenty-one.' 5'
However, the Court applied neither test and instead invalidated the law
under an intermediate level test: to be valid, "classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.' 152 The Oklahoma statute failed this test
because although the state's interest in traffic safety was held to be a suffi-
ciently important governmental objective, the state failed to demonstrate that
it was substantially furthered by the gender classifications. The statute re-
stricted only the beer's sale, not its consumption. Furthermore, the statistics
failed to justify a conclusion that eighteen- to twenty-year-old men who buy
beer are more dangerous than women of the same age. The Court concluded
that because the relationship of gender to traffic safety was so tenuous, the
classifications were not "substantially related to achievement of the statutory
objective." "'
B. Basis for Application of the Intermediate Standard to
Municipal Residence Requirements
The Craig substantial relation test should apply to municipal residence
requirements for much the same reason it applies to gender classifications. In
both instances, the intermediate standard provides real protection, while the
two-tiered approach provides either too much or too little. The Court may not
have recognized gender as a suspect classification because of its reluctance to
apply a standard whose mere invocation dooms a challenged practice to a
finding of invalidity. But the Court has also been wary of granting legislators
as free a hand with gender classification as it has given them with economic
legislation. Most likely, the use of the intermediate standard has been an
attempt to provide fair, meaningful review. Decisions following Craig have
shown that the invocation of the substantial relation test does not trigger
149. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), four Justices agreed that "classifications based upon
sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore
be subjected to close judicial scrutiny." Id. at 682 (citations omitted). That view has never been expressed in a
majority opinion, however, and in view of the Court's comfort with the substantial relation test, sex will
probably remain a classification less than suspect.
150. See note 129 supra.
151. 429 U.S. 190, 221-28 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see Justice Stewart's concurrence: "The
disparity created by these Oklahoma statutes amounts to a total irrationality." Id. at 215.
152. Id. at 197. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (affirming appropriateness of substantial relation test
and holding invalid system that imposed alimony payment obligations on men only).
153. 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
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automatic approval or denialtM4 Rather, the intermediate standard protects a
person's interest in equal treatment by government yet still permits a govern-
ment to impose the "semi-suspect" classifications in exceptional cases. The
judicial hurdle is thus made high but not insurmountable.
A municipal employee's interest in preserving both job and home
deserves similar protection. Residence requirements impose a significant
burden on municipal employees: a person must either forego municipal
employment or give up a home in a chosen community. If an employee
sacrifices either, he loses something of great personal importance. That loss
should be imposed only for a reason that is important, rather than merely "not
irrational." 55
Both job and home occupy positions of importance in American society.
Although under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment a public
employee's property interest in his job receives the limited protection of a
right to a hearing if he is fired, 156 the Court has recognized that a liberty
interest in employment is protected by fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion and fifth amendment due process. In 1915 in Truax v. Raich'5 7 the Court
invalidated an Arizona statute that set employment quotas for aliens. In hold-
ing that the statute violated the equal protection clause, Justice Hughes'
opinion for a seven-member majority stated:
It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common
occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and
opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure....
If this could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the prohibi-
tion of the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be a
barren form of words. 158
154. The Court has upheld under the substantial relation test gender classifications that would not have
survived strict scrutiny. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring opinion necessary
for the judgment); Vorcheimer v. School Dist., 552 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1976) (held that establishment of two
voluntary, single-sex schools violated neither rational basis nor substantial ralation test, affd per curiam, 430
U.S. 703 (1977) (equally divided Court). The Court has also upheld gender classifications having a "'benign"
purpose such as the correction of the effects of past discrimination. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977). Several other cases have, however, employed the Craig standard to hold gender discrimination invalid.
See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
155. An argument for the use of a substantial relation standard for municipal residence requirement cases is
made in Note, Municipal Employee Residency Requirements and Equal Protection, 84 YALE L.J. 1684, 1693-95
(1975). That note inferred the use of an intermediate standard in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 674 (1973), an
alienage case, and suggested that standard as -[o]ne means of circumventing the more troublesome dimensions
of the right to travel argument against residency laws." Id. at 1693. However, the note did not suggest the
appropriate resolution of the question of validity but merely noted that "there is serious question whether the
residency requirements in fact substantially further their putative purposes." Id. at 1704. Since the publication
of that note, the Court has for the first time explicitly embraced an intermediate standard, providing some basis
for predictions of the result of that standard's application to municipal residence requirements. See text accom-
panying notes 178-221 infra.
156. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), held that a public employee's property interest in his
employment requires no greater due process protection than a post-termination hearing to review the
employer's decision. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), further reduced the significance of property rights in
employment by allowing a state to determine the terms of employment in such a way as to eliminate procedural
safeguards for the employee. Still, some property right in employment remains, however slight, and adds to the
significance of employment as a historically important interest.
157. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
158. Id. at 41 (citations omitted).
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Sixty-one years later in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong 59 Justice Stevens'
majority opinion quoted Truax and reaffirmed the importance of seeking and
maintaining employment by holding invalid a United States Civil Service
Commission rule that limited employment in federal competitive civil service
to citizens. Justice Stevens found a violation of fifth amendment due process
rights, holding that the Commission had no authority to promote the national
interest by offering incentives for naturalization."W The Court rejected
administrative convenience as a justification for such a "deprivation of an
important liberty,"'' declaring that the "disadvantage resulting from the
enforcement of the rule-ineligibility for employment in a major sector of the
economy-is of sufficient significance to be characterized as a deprivation of
an interest in liberty."' 62 The Court found it unnecessary to reach an equal
protection challenge to the rule and instead decided that an alien's interest in
employment requires a due process standard more strict than a rational basis
test. 163
It must be noted, of course, that both Truax and Mow Sun Wong are
alienage cases. The Court has recognized alienage and national origin as
suspect classifications and has often applied strict scrutiny of legislation that
disfavors either class. 64 However, characterization of Truax and Mow Sun
Wong as alienage cases does not affect their usefulness in determining the
historical significance of personal interests in employment. Truax was
decided before the Court recognized a separate, stricter level of review for
suspect classifications.' 65 Mow Sun Wong was decided on due process, not
equal protection, grounds; the existence of a significant liberty interest in
public employment, not the suspect nature of the class, determined the out-
come. 66 Thus, these cases demonstrate that regardless of whether equal
protection or due process is at issue, the Court has deemed some regulations
that restrict employment to be deprivations of a significant liberty interest.
Notably, Mow Sun Wong stressed the importance of government employment
as a major sector of the economy. Like the federal civil service, municipal
government employs a substantial portion of the work force. Both cases
support the conclusion that when a municipal residence requirement forces a
person to forego municipal employment to protect his choice of community,
that person loses a significant right that is "of the very essence
of ... personal freedom and opportunity." 67
Equally significant is a person's interest in establishing and maintaining a
159. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
160. Id. at 116-17.
161. Id. at 116.
162. Id. at 102-03.
163. Id. at 103.
164. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
165. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
166. 426 U.S. 88, 100, 116-17 (1975).
167. 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
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home in a community of his choice.'8 Freedom from unwarranted govern-
mental interference in what should be matters of private choice is expected in
a democratic society. The first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech,
press, religion, and assembly, as well as the Constitution's implied protection
of the rights of privacy and association, 69 surely spring from the belief that it
is wrong for a democratic government to tell its people what to say and
believe or with whom to associate. Because those freedoms are express and
the implied rights fundamental, the Constitution affords them its strictest
protection. One can reasonably expect that the Constitution similarly limits
government's authority to tell a person where to make his home, so that his
choice is free from governmental interference absent a significant reason, not
a merely "rational" one.
The Supreme Court has recognized that activities and relationships asso-
ciated with one's private home life merit special protection. Legislatures can-
not prohibit the possession of obscene materials within one's home 170 or deny
foodstamps because of unpopular living arrangements. 7 ' The third and fourth
amendments grant express protection to "houses," with the clear intent of
protecting not the house itself but a person's security within it.
72
No municipal residence requirement is intended to interfere with what
occurs within an employee's home. However, such interference does in-
directly occur. The value of maintaining a home in a particular place extends
beyond the walls of a person's house. The surrounding neighborhood, per-
haps as much as anything else, greatly affects the quality of family life within
the home. A family chooses to live in a particular house not only because of
the design or price of the house, but also because of its nearby schools,
church, parks, markets, or freeway, its atmosphere, its security, or its near-
ness to relatives. Some may prefer a certain neighborhood because of pre-
vious social or political ties or quite simply because they grew up there. The
nature of the chosen community greatly affects the quality of a family's home
life. For example, the prevalence of violent assaults in McCarthy's neighbor-
hood threatened the stability of his household and forced him to risk his job by
moving his family to a safer community outside Philadelphia. 7 1 McCarthy
168. The interest in maintaining a home in a chosen neighborhood should be distinguished from a person's
interest in retaining possession of a particular house or apartment. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74
(1972), rejected claims of a fundamental interest in "decent shelter" or "possession of one's home" advanced
against an Oregon eviction statute. Although a municipal employee may wish to retain possession of a particular
home, the interest advanced in this Comment as a significant personal interest is broader, encompassing the
total relationship between a resident and the community in which he has chosen to reside.
169. See note 129 supra.
170. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
171. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
172. The third amendment provides: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST.
amend. III.
The fourth amendmeht provides in part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S CONST.
amend. IV.
173. See text accompanying notes 107-11 supra.
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testified, "Because of all these [assaults upon our children], my wife said she
was leaving. At that time I pleaded with her to stay .... I have to work in the
city. I have to live in the city. My wife said she was more interested in her
children's life [sic] than in my job."' 74 The choice of a new neighborhood was
McCarthy's attempt to improve the safety and happiness of his family.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland 75 the Supreme Court invalidated, on
due process grounds, an ordinance that prohibited, among other living ar-
rangements, a grandmother's residence with two grandsons who were first
cousins, not brothers. Justice Powell's plurality opinion noted that "the Con-
stitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of
the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' 76 The
Court held that the East Cleveland ordinance interfered too greatly with the
family's choice of living arrangements, finding that only a tenuous relation-
ship existed between the arrangements prohibited and the city's legitimate
interest in avoiding overcrowding, traffic congestion, and financially
burdened schools. 77 Compliance with the ordinance in effect would have
forced Mrs. Moore to either re-arrange her family by excluding one of her
grandsons or move away from the community she had chosen for her home.
Her interest in avoiding the ordinance's penalty or the resulting unfair choice
was sufficiently important that the plurality imposed a due process standard
remarkably similar to that in Craig and certainly more stringent than a rational
basis test. Like the relationship between gender and traffic safety, the rela-
tionship between East Cleveland's interest and Mrs. Moore's living arrange-
ments was "too tenuous"; just as it did in Craig, the plurality in Moore
extended greater protection than it normally would.
Thus, a municipal employee has significant personal interests both in
finding and holding employment and in maintaining a home in a chosen com-
munity. By requiring that a person choose between job and home, a municipal
residence requirement threatens one of those two interests. The substantial
relation test, by demanding that the municipality show more than mere
rationality, lends some meaningful protection to these important interests.
V. APPLICATION OF THE INTERMEDIATE STANDARD
When applied to municipal residence requirements, the substantial rela-
tion test requires two showings: first, that the requirements have been
imposed to serve an important governmental objective and, second, that
establishment and-maintenance of residence within a municipality will sub-
stantially further those objectives. 7 Both steps are difficult to apply with
174. McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n. 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 383, 339 A.2d 634, 637 (1975)
(dissenting opinion).
175. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
176. Id. at 503.
177. Id. at 499-500.
178. See text accompanying note 152 supra.
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certainty. "Important" and "substantial" are imprecise terms that have, as
yet, been barely defined. Because the test was recently developed, few guide-
lines exist to delineate differences among objectives that are compelling,
important, or merely legitimate or between relations that are substantial or
merely rational. When courts hold a statute or ordinance invalid under the
substantial relation test, they frequently avoid determining whether a state or
municipality's advanced objectives are "important." Instead, they assume
the objective's importance and analyze the relationship between means and
ends.'79
A. Importance of the Governmental Objective
The objectives said to be served by municipal residence requirements fall
into seven general categories: (1) maintenance of the municipality's economic
stability; (2) curtailment of inner-city cultural decline; (3) reduction of urban
unemployment; (4) reduction of absenteeism and tardiness; (5) administrative
convenience; (6) improvement of an employee's availability for emergency
duty; and (7) development of community identity so that employees will feel
they have a personal stake in the municipality's future.'80 Certainly all seven
objectives are legitimate concerns of municipal government because they
directly or indirectly affect the municipality's ability to provide for the safety
of its citizens.
Only two of the objectives stand out as being arguably less than impor-
tant. Unless absenteeism and tardiness reach epidemic proportions, they do
not pose a direct threat to safety or welfare and, therefore, in most instances
should not be deemed important. And, as Mow Sun Wong demonstrates,
administrative convenience alone may not be a sufficiently important govern-
mental objective to justify an otherwise invalid classification. 8' Evaluation of
this objective most likely turns on the expense involved; if a great number of
individual determinations, conducted at significant expense to the administra-
tor, would result from invalidation of the rule, administrative convenience
might become an important objective. But if a rule persists merely to keep
matters simple, administrative convenience loses its importance. At this point
in the analysis, however, it is sufficient to note that under certain circum-
stances any of the objectives suggested could be termed "important." There-
fore, the second part of the intermediate standard becomes the primary
measure of a residence requirement's validity.
179. See, e.g., Coban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
180. These objectives have been distilled from the range of justifications offered for municipal residence
requirements by both courts, see text accompanying notes 32-106 supra, and commentators, see text accom-
panying note 18 supra.
181. 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976).
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B. Whether Objectives Are Substantially Furthered
Once the governmental objectives are found, or assumed, to be impor-
tant, the next step is to determine whether residence requirements substanti-
ally further those objectives. This second step has been described as a re-
quirement of "close fit.' '82 Crazig held the Oklahoma gender classifications
invalid because of a "far too tenuous' 83 fit between the means chosen
(distinctions based on narrow statistical differences between men and women)
and the important objectives served (protection of public safety).'64 The test
requires more than a "rational" belief that governmental objectives will be
advanced to some degree. Craig's insistence on a "fit" that is more than
tenuous amounts to a requirement that the government demonstrate a signifi-
cant likelihood that the objectives will be furthered to a substantial degree.
Because this test of the validity of a municipal residence requirement
demands such a close relationship between means and ends, it is proper to
require that such conditions on employment actually affect the quality of an
employee's performance on the job.'85 If the ultimate goal is not the improve-
ment of city services through improved job performance, the fit is tenuous. A
municipality therefore errs when it uses a municipal residence requirement to
shore up a sagging economy, 6 prevent cultural changes within the inner
city, 87 or reduce urban unemployment.
88
1. Objectives Unrelated to Job Performance
Whether discussed under the right/privilege,' 89 public coffer,'9° or
"'mutual financial support"' 9 ' theories, the use of a municipal residence re-
quirement to serve solely economic objectives represents an effort to ensure,
as much as possible, that an employee spends his wages within the city.
Causing a policeman to spend most of his wages within the city will neither
make him a better policeman nor improve the quality of police protection.
182. L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1083 (1978).
183. 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
184. Id. See also text accompanying notes 148-53 supra.
185. Most courts have decided the question of the requirements' validity by examination of the duties of
the employees affected. See, e.g., Hanson v. Unified School Dist. No. 500, 364 F. Supp. 332 (D. Kan. 1973)
(teachers); Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972) (police and firemen); Abrahams v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974) (secretary). However, when using a rational basis test, courts have
frequently looked beyond the relationship between job performance and residence, and have instead considered
purposes directed generally at all employees, as for example when a court utilized a public coffer theory. See
text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
186. See text accompanying notes 189-92 infra.
187. See text accompanying note 193 infra.
188. Id.
189. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
190. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
191. One proponent of residence requirements has suggested that "mutual financial support" is a compel-
ling governmental objective in a declining urban center. See Hager, Residency Requirements for City Em-
ployees: Important Incentives in Today's Urban Crisis, 18 URB. L. ANN. 197, 221-22 (1980). However, nothing
seems to distinguish the mutual financial support theory from the public coffer theory rejected by several courts.
See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
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Furthermore, residence requirements will not significantly improve a city's
economy. In many American cities, shopping malls, discount houses, medical
centers, and entertainment facilities operate either adjacent to highways out-
side the city limits or in small independent municipalities within the large
city's limits. The mobility of most Americans suggests that much of an
employee's spending may take place outside of the city, regardless of his
residence. With the exception of property taxes, then, a residence require-
ment supplies no additional tax revenues from the employee, for a municipal-
ity can tax wages paid in the city to nonresident employees.'
Underlying a municipality's governmental objective to prevent inner-city
cultural decline is the fear that suburban communities will lure away the city's
employed citizens, leaving behind a population of poor, unemployed minori-
ties. One proponent of municipal residence requirements has portrayed the
future as bleak: "[A]s a city deteriorates ... there is a probability that the
central cities will become densely populated with persons dependent on
public assistance .... [A]s residential blight and unemployment increase,
crime rates may rise. Inevitable problems with education and other public
services also arise.
' 
1
93
Preventing such decline is no doubt an important objective. However, as
with economic objectives, the residence requirement is intended to affect
something other than the employee's job performance. The cultural decline
argument is a "but for the nail the war was lost" approach to stimulating
urban health. The doom forecast for urban centers will hardly be forestalled,
if at all, by the imposition of residence requirements on municipal employees.
It is unlikely that any American cities are made up entirely of imperiled urban
core. Most cities contain areas within their jurisdictional limits that are as
culturally separated from low-income, minority neighborhoods as if they were
distant suburbs. Municipal residence requirements may often mean that city
employees will reside in exclusive, middle class neighborhoods adjacent to
and culturally indistinct from exclusive, middle class suburbs. It is possible,
then, for a municipal employee to meet the requirement and at the same to do
no more service to the objective than would a nonresident. Thus, while a
rational argument can be made that residence requirements do something,
however small, to save the inner city, the relationship between means and end
is less than substantial.
Furthermore, a municipal residence requirement without a durational
element does little to promote employment of urban residents. The hiring of a
job applicant who has become a resident only to qualify for the job or who
accepts ajob under a condition that he become a resident within a reasonable
time does not benefit unemployed residents. In a tight housing market, hiring
the former nonresident will actually work to the disadvantage of an unem-
192. Thompson v. City of Cincinnati, 2 Ohio St. 2d 292, 208 N.E.2d 747 (1965).
193. Hager, Residency Requirements for City Employees: Important Incentives in Today's Urban Crisis,
18 URB. L. ANN. 197, 221-22 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
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ployed resident by bringing into the city someone able to pay more for the
limited available housing, thus reducing the number of affordable dwellings.
But more importantly, when imposed to serve the objective of reducing the
unemployment of urban residents, the residence requirement is used to affect
something other than job performance.
The above-mentioned governmental objectives of improving the munici-
pality's economy, preventing cultural decline, and reducing urban unemploy-
ment, although not substantially served by municipal residence requirements,
are nevertheless important and within the proper concerns of municipal
government. Only the tenuity of the relationship between means and ends
violates equal protection. The objectives may yet be served by other means
that do not so greatly threaten significant personal interests. The war may yet
be won with other nails.
2. Objectives Related to Job Performance
Other objectives do relate, some more directly than others, to the quality
of an employee's job performance. However, mere connection between
residence and performance will not suffice. To satisfy the intermediate
standard, a municipality must demonstrate that a substantial relationship
exists between an employee's residence and the duties of his job. If residence
within the city limits results in only an uncertain likelihood that performance
will be improved, an employee should not be forced to choose between a job
and his community. Therefore, proper analysis must include examination of
how substantially a residence requirement serves the important governmental
objectives of reduction of absenteeism, administrative convenience, emerg-
ency availability, and development of community identity. As will be seen,
the latter two objectives can best be examined by their applicability to certain
categories of municipal employees.94 The other two will apply generally to all
employees equally.
The imposition of a residence requirement to reduce absenteeism or
tardiness seems a drastic measure. Other, more effective means exist to
enforce punctuality and attendance rules. For example, the threat of a reduc-
tion of wages or a delay of promotion in relation to hours late or days missed
should serve equally the objective without impairing significant personal
interests. The typical rush-hour traffic problems of many cities may make
commuting by train or subway from a suburb faster than traveling to work
from a residence within the city. Furthermore, the employee who resides
outside the city may still live closer to his place of duty near the city's edge
than a co-worker who lives in a distant part of the city.
The imposition of a municipal residence requirement on all employees
equally, rather than on a case-by-case basis, certainly affects administrative
convenience. Individual determinations might be required if the residence
194. See text accompanying notes 197-221 infra.
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requirements were held invalid under an "irrebuttable presumption" ration-
ale. 95 However, the resulting expense and difficulty in a city with a large
work force would be a greater burden than an intermediate standard should
require. The greater the number of individual determinations made, the
greater the danger that the requirements will not be applied fairly to similarly
situated employees. Nevertheless, imposition of the requirements equally on
all employees may increase too greatly the danger of over-inclusiveness. 96 A
middle approach aimed at determining the appropriateness of residence
requirements for different classes of employees by looking at their normal
duties should satisfy the requirements of the intermediate test. Thus, a
municipal residence requirement will be a valid condition of employment if
maintaining residence will substantially improve or affect the performance of
the duties of the particular class to whom the requirement applies. The valid-
ity of the requirement under a substantial relation test will turn on whether the
affected employee is, for example, a policeman, school teacher, or file
clerk.' 97
Municipal employment can be divided into four categories according to
the general nature of the work involved: (1) safety personnel, such as police
and firefighters; (2) elected or appointed officers and administrative person-
nel, whose duties include policy making; (3) "general service" employees,
such as file clerks, secretaries, and sanitation workers; and (4) "special
service" employees, such as school teachers, counselors, and social workers.
The duties associated with occupation within each category will determine the
validity of imposing a residence requirement on each. Those duties should be
evident from civil service job descriptions or from the content of an employ-
195. In the early 1970s, the Court on several occasions employed the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine
to invalidate government practices that "classified people for a burden or benefit without determining the
individual merit of their claims." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497 (1978).
The doctrine shared aspects of both equal protection review of classifications and due process determination of
fairness. On the basis of irrebuttable presumption analysis, the Court struck down a college tuition system that
precluded any student who had at one time been a nonresident from showing that he had become a legitimate
state resident, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), and a school system's mandatory leave requirement for
pregnant teachers, imposed without individual determinations. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974). See also United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
The doctrine is probably of little aid when residence requirements are at issue for two reasons. First, the
Court seems to have retreated from its earlier embrace of the doctrine. The Court has not invoked the doctrine in
several cases that have presented what would appear to be irrebuttable presumption questions. See Massa-
chusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). Second, it is
difficult to say precisely what a municipality has presumed by its imposition of a residence requirement. As the
Tenth Circuit noted in Mogle v. Sevier County School Dist., 540 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1121 (1977), in each of the irrebuttable presumption cases,
[A] fact question was identified and then decided by a conclusive presumption.... [A] residency
requirement does not involve such identification of a controlling fact question and decision of it by an
irrebuttable presumption. There are numerous factors that may undergird the [Board's]
policy .... It is not shown that application of the policy to this plaintiff involves a presumption
against him on any particular point.
Id. at 484-85 (footnote omitted).
196. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), and discussion in text accompanying notes
204-07 infra.
197. See note 185 supra.
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ment contract. However, the existence of a substantial relationship between
the performance of those duties and residence within the city will be less
evident.
When a municipal employee's significant personal interests are at stake,
evidence of that substantial relationship must be introduced, not presumed.'
Absent that evidence, any determination of a residence requirement's validity
would rest on judges' presumptions, hardly a satisfactory basis for deciding
whether an employee will be required to choose between job and community.
Review of municipal residence requirement cases shows that courts have
failed to demand such evidence. Rather, in accord with traditional rational
basis scrutiny, most courts have accepted the legislative presumption of a
reasonable relationship.' 99 Even when courts have upheld the requirements
under a stricter standard of review, the relationship between means and ends
has been accepted without statistical evidence or expert testimony.200 Except
for citation in Krzewinski to the reports of a presidential commission on law
enforcement and a governor's committee on civil disorders,20' neither courts
nor commentators have cited studies or authoritative opinion demonstrating
that any substantial relationship exists between residence and job perfor-
mance. Such evidence is apparently in short supply, perhaps because neither
lawmakers nor courts have demanded it. Despite the shortage of evidence, it
is worthwhile here to predict the outcome of the application of the substantial
relation test to each category of employees, with hope that the gaps will be
filled some day by better evidence than broad generalizations about these
employees' duties.
No court, regardless of the standard used, has invalidated on federal
constitutional grounds a residence requirement for safety personnel. As noted
above, Krzewinski relied on a presidential commission's report for justifica-
tion of such a requirement. That 1967 report concluded:
Aside from convenience, local residence avoids the impression that the police
come from the outside world to impose law and order on the poor and minority
groups and also avoids the risk of police isolation from the needs, morals and
customs of the community. ... Perhaps more effectively than any amount of
training, off duty contact between police and the people they serve prevents the
stereotyping of police by citizens and citizens by police.... Wherever possible,
198. Courts should be especially wary of allowing the impairment of a person's significant interests on the
strength of "judicial notice" of a relationship between performance and residence. For an example of such
judicial notice under a compelling interest test, see Fraternal Order of Police, Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v.
Hunter, 49 Ohio App. 2d 185, 360 N.E.2d 708 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976). See also discussion in
note 20 supra.
199. See, e.g., cases cited in note 118 supra.
200. In neither Fraternal Order of Police nor Krzevinski were any evidentiary hearings held. Fraternal
Order of Police, Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Hunter, 49 Ohio App. 2d 185, 198-200, 360 N.E.2d 708, 716-18
(1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976); Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 495 (D.N.J. 1972).
201. 338 F. Supp. 492, 500 (D.N.J. 1972).
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police officers should be encouraged to live within the city limits for it is important
officers have a feeling of commitment to the city, above and beyond the obliga-
tion to police it.
202
Aside from this community identity objective, the emergency nature of the
duties of safety personnel will remain an important consideration.2 3 As noted
above, this objective would probably be best served by a geographical prox-
imity requirement. Nevertheless, the substantial relation test requires only
substantial, not best, service of the objective. Justification likely exists for a
determination that residence requirements for safety personnel bear a sub-
stantial relation to community identity and emergency availability objectives.
Any determination of the qualifications of officers and administrative
personnel who engage in policy making involves not only the important objec-
tives listed above, but also, as the Supreme Court noted in 1973 in Sugarman
v. Dougall,204 preservation of "the basic conception of a political com-
munity." 20 In Sugarman the Court invalidated a New York rule that limited
eligibility for competitive civil service positions to American citizens, holding
that the rule applied too broadly to both general service employees and policy
makers. 2' 6 The Court applied strict scrutiny and held that classifications of
that type required a "greater degree of precision. ' 21
Five years later in Foley v. Connelie208 the Court upheld on the basis of
Sugarman's political community concept a New York requirement that state
troopers be American citizens. Said Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion:
The act of becoming a citizen is more than a ritual with no content beyond the
fanfare of ceremony.... The individual, at that point, belongs to the polity and is
entitled to participate in the process of democratic decisionmaking .... [W]e have
recognized that citizenship may be a relevant qualification for fulfilling those
"important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions," held by
"officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of
broad public policy." This is not because our society seeks to reserve the better
jobs to its members. Rather, it is because this country entrusts many of its most
important policy responsibilities to these officers .... In sum, then, it represents
the choice, and right, of the people to be governed by their citizen peers. 209
Nonresidents, like noncitizens, have not joined the political community and,
therefore, may be excluded from policy-making administrative positions.
Nonresident employees are actually even further removed from the political
202. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT, THE POLICE (1967), quoted in Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 500
(D.N.J. 1972).
203. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
204. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
205. Id. at 647 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)).
206. Id. at 643.
207. Id. at 642.
208. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
209. Id. at 295-96 (citations omitted).
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community than are those noncitizens who, as residents, are taxpayers and
more direct contributors to the city's cultural life. The Couirt's holding that
state troopers fit the description of such policy makers210 could also lend
further support to imposition of residence requirements on police.
It seems unlikely that residence in the city will significantly affect job
performance by general service personnel. Unless studies show that develop-
ment of community identity will encourage a secretary to type more effici-
ently or that emergencies are likely to arise that would require a file clerk
close at hand, there seems little on which to base a finding of substantial
relationship between residence and performance.21' Furthermore, it is worth
noting that in Sugarman the Court found the civil service exclusion of non-
citizens over-inclusive because it applied to general service personnel as well
as policy makers 12 Of course, Sugarman was decided on the basis of strict
scrutiny of alienage classifications and does not mandate a similar result
under a substantial relation test. Nevertheless, it is likely that the exclusion
would also be over-inclusive when tested under the intermediate standard.
The closest questions involve special services personnel. To what extent
does community identity improve the relationships of teacher and student or
social worker and client? How far beyond school walls do the duties of a
teacher or counselor extend? What sort of emergencies arise that require the
availability of social workers? The difficulty of answering these questions
underscores the need for persuasive evidence about the relationship between
performance and residence.
Municipal residence requirement cases also demonstrate the closeness of
the questions. Although residence requirements for teachers have often been
held valid under a rational basis test,2 3 two cases, Donnelly2 4 and Hanson,
2
'
5
have invalidated such requirements, the latter case holding the requirement
"essentially arbitrary" and without "any reasonable basis. ' ,21 6 In Mogle v.
Sevier County School District2M7 the Tenth Circuit held a residence require-
ment valid for a high school counselor in a school district that did not impose a
similar requirement on teachers. 28 The court held the requirement reasonably
related to legitimate goals of improving personal contact between the coun-
selor and both students and their parents, increasing awareness of local
community problems, encouraging greater involvement in local activities, and
210. Id. at 300.
211. For an example of application of the compelling interest test to general service employees, see
Fraternal Order of Police, Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Hunter, 49 Ohio App. 2d 185, 360 N.E.2d 708 (1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976). For an example of application of the rational basis test to a secretary, see
Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974).
212. 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973).
213. See, e.g., Wardwell v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
214. Donnelly v. City of Manchester, Ill N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971).
215. Hanson v. Unified School Dist. No. 500, 364 F. Supp. 330 (D. Kan. 1973).
216. Id. at 334.
217. 540 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
218. Id. at 480-82.
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simply having the counselor close at hand.2 9 Even though the counselor lived
only eleven miles from his employment in a sparsely populated area of Utah
and no members of the school board had ever complained about his ability to
perform his duties, his dismissal was sustained on the basis of a post-
McCarthy rational basis test.220 The court noted, however, that the espoused
objectives were "less substantial than those outlined in Wardwell,"'22' thus
raising doubt whether it would have decided the issue the same way under a
substantial relation test.
Many of the community identity arguments that apply to safety personnel
may seem to apply to special services personnel as well. An understanding of
the ethnic or cultural background of students and counselees should improve
a teacher's or counselor's ability to aid and communicate with the people he
serves. However, requiring residence may be a more drastic measure than is
necessary. Community identity could be encouraged as-easily and effectively
by requiring those employees to participate in specific community organiza-
tions or special study of the community's social make-up. Such a method
would perhaps be insufficient for safety personnel, whose performance more
directly requires the cooperation of all residents in the community served.
Teachers and counselors, on the other hand, can perform their jobs well with
less direct contact with the community. Therefore, it is possible to conclude
that the relationship between residence and performance of these employees'
duties is not sufficiently substantial to justify impairment of their significant
personal interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, whatever the quantity of facts, figures, and expert opinion,
intermediate review of municipal residence requirements will most likely
amount to an application of the particular court's notions of what relations are
"substantial" enough to justify a municipality's interference with its em-
ployees' significant interests. As a practical matter, substance, like fairness,
can be measured only in the mind of the measurer; the test will always be
somewhat subjective. Nevertheless, the intermediate standard is a useful
means of narrowing the question, a way to clear the waters so easily muddied
by the plethora of justifications that municipalities have thrown in to support
the requirements. Ultimately, the question can be narrowly stated: Is it impor-
tant to the performance of this employee's job that he live in the city? Put this
way, the issue appears simple. But because the interests at stake-employ-
ment and choice of community-are significant, no simple answer will suffice.
The review must be a meaningful, cautious, and reasoned determination,
based on proof of the substance of the relationship of residence to duties.
Thomas A. Hampton
219. Id. at 485-86.
220. Id. at 483.
221. Id. at 484.
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